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The provision of robust position, navigation and timing (PNT) 
information is a fundamental element of the e-Navigation 
initiative proposed by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). In this context the single Electronic Position Fixing 
System (EPFS), which currently conforms to the minimum 
carriage requirement, should be replaced by an integrated PNT 
unit as future onboard integrated system. This unit has the task 
to collect and integrate data from individual PNT sensors in 
order to deliver robust PNT information with a specified 
performance. In this paper the current status of PNT sensors for 
maritime application is reviewed and first ideas towards an 
integrity concept for a maritime PNT unit are presented. 




As a consequence of increased maritime traffic and caused 
incidents, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has 
issued the “e-Navigation Strategy” in order to support its vision 
of “Safe, secure, and efficient shipping on clean oceans” [1].  
E-Navigation (e = electronic/enhanced) is considered as a 
strategic framework for developing existing and future 
technological infrastructure onboard and ashore. It is defined as 
[1]: the harmonised creation, collection, integration, exchange 
and presentation of maritime information onboard and ashore 
by electronic means to enhance berth to berth navigation and 
related services, for safety and security at sea and protection of 
the marine environment.  
IMO defined the overarching framework for developing the 
e-Navigation architecture by introducing a strategy for the 
development and implementation of e-Navigation [2]. It can be 
divided into three parts: an onboard part, an ashore part and the 
communication link between both parts. The vision for the 
onboard part herein is a navigation system that benefits from 
the integration of own ship sensors, supporting information, a 
standard user interface, and a comprehensive system for 
managing guard zones and alerts.  
Position fixing has been identified as one of the key 
strategic elements of e-Navigation and hence should meet user 
needs in terms of accuracy, integrity, reliability and system 
redundancy in accordance with the level of risk and volume of 
traffic. 
Following the vision of e-Navigation the International 
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse 
Authorities (IALA) has proposed an integrated e-Navigation 
PNT device as part of an Integrated Navigational System (INS) 
[3].  
The basic idea is to replace the currently required 
Electronic Position Fixing System (EPFS) on board of a vessel, 
which is only based on a single PNT source. We interpret a 
PNT unit as a system function, which collects and integrates 
data from individual PNT sensors in order to deliver robust 
PNT information with a specified performance (e.g. accuracy, 
integrity). The PNT unit should internally identify and 
automatically switch to the sensors or sensor combinations 
delivering the best PNT solution.  
The PNT unit should be based on a GNSS core element and 
aided by appropriate augmentation systems. It should also 
include interfaces for the utilization of adequate sensors to 
maintain redundancy, backup or contingency functionality of 
the system in case of a failure of the primary GNSS sensor.  
In a modular concept a PNT unit can be seen as one part of 
an Integrated Navigational System (INS) which is responsible 
for delivering the position, navigation and timing information. 
The INS should use this information in order to perform its 
system tasks like collision avoidance, route planning and route 
monitoring.   
Following the ideas of the e-navigation strategy this paper 
will discuss a concept of an integrated PNT unit for maritime 
applications. In section II, the requirements of a PNT unit will 
be derived from the relevant user needs. In section III, the 
current status of standard sensors providing PNT information 
onboard a vessel will be described. From the comparison 
between the actual status and the defined requirements, a gap 
analysis will be performed. Subsequently possible non-
standard sensors providing additional PNT information will 
discussed in section IV. Finally in section V, we will present 
first ideas towards an integrity concept for a maritime PNT 
unit. 
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR A MARITIME PNT UNIT 
A. User needs  
The implementation of the e-Navigation strategy starts with 
the identification of user needs. Therefore different user 
surveys were conducted and summarized in [4]. Referring to 
the tasks of a PNT unit, the following three user needs can be 
identified:  
i. Improved reliability: Before mariners can feel 
confident about relying on systems under the e-
navigation concept, they must prove far more reliable 
than many of the present systems. 
ii. Indication of reliability 
iii. Alert management: Bridge alerts (emergency alarms, 
alarms, warnings and cautions) must be coordinated, 
weighted, and support decision making without undue 
distraction.  
Concerning user need (i) the main question is how to make 
the user feel more comfortable when relying on a PNT system. 
Therefore the term “reliability” needs to be detailed in 
measurable parameters, including: a) accuracy, b) integrity, c) 
continuity d) availability. IMO has given a definition of these 
parameters for maritime applications. For instance, integrity is 
defined as the ability to provide users with warnings within a 
specified time when the system should not be used for 
navigation. Additionally, an alert limit needs to be defined 
during integrity monitoring in order to identify the maximum 
allowable error in position domain before an alarm is triggered. 
Following this, an integrity monitoring needs to be performed 
for each output parameter, where the measurement error is 
estimated and checked against a certain threshold (alert limit). 
Here it needs to be taken into account, that the accuracy 
requirements and the alert limit may vary temporally and / or 
spatially.  
User need (ii) is a task of the Human Machine Interface 
(HMI) rather than a task of the PNT unit. In this case, the PNT 
unit only provides reliability indicators to the HMI. 
With respect to user need (iii), a PNT unit needs a defined 
interface to the overall alert management system of the vessel 
and needs to keep tracking the entire sensor systems used 
within the unit itself. Since a PNT unit comes with 
functionalities to detect failure of sensors, the unit will include 
its own PNT alert management.       
B. Requirements for a PNT unit    
Based on the identified user needs, the requirements for a 
maritime PNT unit would need to be drawn. This is actually a 
task of the maritime organizations. Within this paper we will 
review existing standards with respect to those requirements 
and highlight open points. 
In [5] IALA has evaluated the GNSS vulnerability and 
recommends possible mitigation measures. Especially the need 
of redundant, backup or contingency sources of PNT 
information is highlighted. The definitions of these terms are 
given below:  
A redundant system provides the same functionality as the 
primary system, allowing a seamless transition with no change 
in procedures. 
A backup system ensures continuation of the navigation 
application, but not necessarily with the full functionality of the 
primary system and may necessitate some change in 
procedures by the user. 
A contingency system allows safe completion of a manoeuvre, 
but may not be adequate for long-term use. 
For the selection of sensors for a PNT unit it is necessary to 
check which of these system functionalities can be provided.  
In the next step the basic output parameters of a maritime 
PNT unit need to be defined. As a preliminary design, the 
following parameters should be offered by a PNT unit: 
(i) Position: It mainly contains the longitude and latitude 
for maritime navigations. Because vessels can usually be found 
close to the sea level, the height information is usually not 
provided as standard output parameter.  
(ii) Under keel clearance (UKC): Instead of the height 
information, the UKC is the relevant maritime output 
parameter. It is defined as the distance between the lowest 
point of the ship (e.g. the keel) and the ground of the sea.   
(iii) Velocity: The magnitude and direction of a velocity 
vector can be described by Speed over Ground (SOG) and 
Course over Ground (COG). Because of their physical 
principles, speed sensors like e.g. electro-magnetic logs can 
only measure the speed through water (STW), and therefore 
STW is also a parameter which a PNT unit could deliver. 
 (iv) Attitude: Generally the orientation of the ship in the 
horizontal plane is reported. Here one needs to distinguish 
between the orientation with respect to the true north (true 
heading) and with respect to the magnetic north (heading). For 
future applications, the other attitude angles, namely roll and 
pitch, could also be required. 
(v) Timing: UTC time needs to be delivered. 
After clarification of the basic output parameters, user 
requirements concerning accuracy and integrity with respect to 
the different areas of maritime traffic needs to be defined. 
Looking into existing standards, the IMO document regarding 
the requirements for a future GNSS could be interpreted as user 
requirements for the positioning part of the PNT unit, as shown 
in Table I.     
TABLE I: IMO REQUIREMENTS FOR A FUTURE GNSS [6] 
 
For the other output parameters of the PNT unit such user 
requirements categorized by different areas of marine traffic 
cannot be found. Existing IMO standards correspond to 
individual sensors which deliver usually a single parameter. 
Normally, only the minimal acceptable accuracy is specified 
for these sensors, which mainly corresponds to the capability of 
this specific sensor. Accept for positioning, integrity 






Position Err r  H/V [m] <10 / NA <1 / NA <0.1 
Al rm limit [m] 25 2.5 0.25 
Time to alarm [s] 10 10 10 
Integrity risk 1e-5/3h 1e-5/3h 1e-5/3h 
Availability [%per30days] 99.8 99.8 99.8 
Continuity [%over 3h] NA 99.97 99.97 
Coverage global local local 
III. ANALYSIS OF STANDARD PNT SENSORS AND INTEGRITY 
APPROACHES  
A. Sensor analysis 
According to the carriage requirement demanded by IMO 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention [7], following 
sensors should be used in maritime applications. 
TABLE II. IMO DEMANDED SENSORS FOR PNT UNIT 
Sensor Output Typical realization 
Speed log STW Electromagnetic 
logs 
 
SOG Doppler logs 
















Echo sounder UKC Sonar 
 
GNSS has become the most popular sensor for EPFS in the 
maritime navigation. GNSS, currently GPS and GLONASS 
offer two positioning possibilities in maritime navigation, the 
Standard Positioning Service (SPS) and Differential GNSS 
(DGNSS). Besides the current GPS and GLONASS system, 
the European Galileo system under development is another 
promising candidate, which offers two services for maritime 
community: Safety of Life and Open Service [8]. 
For maritime application there exist separate standards for 
GNSS, including: GPS receiver [9], GLONASS receiver[10], 
GPS/GLONASS combined receiver [11], DGPS and 
DGLONASS receiver [12], Galileo receiver [8].  
These standards are based on their respective GNSS service 
specifications only. There exists no obvious mapping of these 
standards to the requirements on the EPFS. Additionally, the 
option that one GNSS system could serve as redundant system 
to another GNSS system (e.g. GLONASS ? GPS) is not 
discussed in these standards.   
Speed logs are the shipborne sensors outputting the speed 
information. Speed logs work independently of the radio 
signals, so that they are used as main sensor for velocity 
determination. GNSS-based velocity determination can serve 
as redundant system and enables the integrity monitoring for 
speed information.  
Gyrocompass [13] or magnetic compass [14] is needed to 
measure the orientation of the ship body in the horizontal 
plane. Although the true heading obtained from gyrocompasses 
is normally of great interest in the maritime navigation, 
magnetic compasses are still popular sensors due to its small 
size, light weight, flexible installation and independence of 
power supply. Compasses can be coupled with speed logs to 
implement the Dead Reckoning (DR) which plays a roll of 
contingency of GNSS positioning.  
THD [15] could obtain heading information from an 
external system and transfer it to PNT unit. One possible 
realization of a THD is a GNSS multi-antenna system [16]. Its 
cost-effectiveness, non-drifted results and acceptable accuracy 
make it draw more and more attentions in maritime application.  
However, such a system suffers from the same limitations as 
GNSS. Besides that, the processing of GNSS carrier phase data 
is still a challenging task, especially for single-frequency 
receiver and long-baseline configuration. 
Echo sounder [17] uses ultrasonic sound pulses directed 
down from vessel to measure the distance to the sea bottom, so 
it is a direct measurement of the UKC and does not rely on an 
external service.  
For the above listed sensors except for GNSS, the self-
monitoring of integrity is still an issue. It will be addressed 
later that the plausibility tests and validity tests are commonly-
used approaches [18]. Nevertheless, the implementation of 
both tests needs to consider the individual sensor specifications 
and the properties of the ship, and no standard algorithm is 
defined.  
B. Integrity monitoring 
1)  for GNSS 
a) IALA Beacon DGNSS  
GNSS integrity-monitoring services are usually part of 
augmentation services which also provide DGNSS corrections. 
The reason for this shared activity is the similarity of the 
infrastructure required for DGNSS and integrity monitoring. 
The IALA beacon Differential GNSS service is a standardized 
technique for maritime use. The competent authority should 
refer to [19] for recommendations of implementing integrity 
checks of the DGNSS system.   
Currently within the IALA Beacon DGNSS only the 
integrity of the DGNSS service is monitored, and a flag bit is 
distributed to indicate whether or not the correction data of this 
station should be used. Currently, IALA Beacon DGNSS 
service is not an integrity monitor for the GNSS service itself. 
For example, it does not check the health status of the satellites 
in view.  However, it could principally be used for that 
purpose.   
For future maritime application, also other augmentation 
systems could be used for integrity monitoring purpose [5], like 
e.g. Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (WAAS and 
EGNOS) or RTK based GBAS systems [20]. 
b) Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) 
RAIM is a technique whereby the redundant information 
available at a GNSS receiver is autonomously processed to 
monitor the integrity of the navigation signals [6]. RAIM has 
two-fold tasks, first is to check the occurrence of a failure, and 
second is to identify the satellite(s) in error. RAIM can be done 
by using the measurement recorded at a single epoch only (so 
called “snapshot” algorithm) or employing earlier 
measurement. The first approach needs the redundant 
measurement, and hence different numbers of satellites in view 
lead to different performance. In [21], several classic 
“snapshot” algorithms are introduced. Optimal RAIM 
algorithms should exhibit high detection rates and low false 
alarm rates [22]. 
IMO requires that shipborne GNSS receivers should offer 
an internal integrity test, but it does not specify a standard 
algorithm and relevant parameters for maritime application.  
2) Integrated Naviagtion System (INS) 
 
An INS is a composed system which provides integrated 
and augmented functions to support system tasks like collision 
avoidance, route planning and route monitoring. Currently an 
INS is not a mandatory system, but if an INS is installed 
onboard a vessel it is accepted as a replacement of the 
mandatory single sensors. Integrity monitoring is considered as 
an intrinsic function of the INS. The currently valid INS 
standard is based on IMO resolution MSC.86 (70) [23] and is 
specified within the IEC-61924 standard [24]. A task oriented 
concept is already introduced in a new resolution MSC.252 
(83) [25], but the specification within the related IEC standard 
is not yet published. Therefore our analysis is based on IEC-
61924 standard only. According to IEC-61924 the plausibility 
check and validity check are required as standard approaches 
for detecting the gross sensor failure [26]. The plausibility 
check tests whether the sensor raw data or derived navigational 
result falls into predefined value range. For example, an output 
of 181º from a gyrocompass ranging between -180º to +180º is 
not plausible. The validity is tested by comparing the sensor 
data or derived navigational results with formal and logical 
criteria, such as whether they fit the ships’ maneuver or 
dynamic properties, or whether they are consistent with the 
environment nearby. For example, if the output of a speed log 
is larger than the maximal achievable speed of the ship, a 
sensor failure can be assured.  
Besides plausibility and validity checks, an integrity 
monitoring based on the following parameters is also required: 
(i) Position: comparison with a second EPFS; using RAIM 
GNSS function; dead reckoning using the ship’s heading and 
speed measuring device 
(ii) Heading: comparison with a second heading sensor and a 
course over ground sensor 
(iii) SOG: comparison with a second SOG sensor, with speed 
through water sensor and with SOG from the EPFS (GNSS) 
(iv) Time: comparison with a second time sensor and with the 
internal INS clock  
(v) UKC: comparison with a second depth sensor and with 
data derived from ships position and electronic navigation 
charts (ENC)  
The threshold for integrity calculations shall be based on 
the specified or expected (where not specified) sensor accuracy 
at a probability of 95 % [24].  
Comparing the user needs described before with the current 
standard of the INS the following gaps can be identified:  
i. Position, as the most important PNT information, 
currently needs to be measured by only two separate 
receiver/antenna GNSS devices. Integrity monitoring is 
restricted to a comparison of the positions determined 
by these two receivers. In case of a failure of this 
GNSS system no redundant or backup system is 
available.  
ii. Currently onboard a vessel no estimation of 
positioning error is performed.  
iii. As already mentioned, the application of a RAIM is 
requested, but the algorithms need to be defined. This 
is a prerequisite for the definition of a further usage of 
the RAIM output.   
iv. The performance requirement on future GNSS is 
categorized into different operational areas, as shown 
in Table I. However, in order to really check against 
these requirements, these areas themselves and the 
intersection from one area to another need to be clearly 
marked in the Electronic Navigational Charts.  
IV. SELECTION OF SENSORS FOR PNT UNIT 
The selection of sensors used in the integrated PNT unit 
should take two points into consideration. Firstly, each PNT 
output should be acquirable from at least one sensor 
independently (not by sensor integration). Secondly, redundant 
information for each PNT output is needed to realize the 
integrity monitoring. Table III  shows the PNT output and 
corresponding sensors. The rows with white background 
represent the standard sensor, whereas the rows with dark 
background represent the non-standard sensors which will be 
introduced in the latter parts. 
TABLE III. SENSORS AND OUTPUT 
 
Pos COG SOG True 
Heading 
ROT Time UKC 
Major GNSS 
device 
M M R   M  
Second GNSS 
device 
R R R R B R  
Second GNSS 
system 
R R R   R  
Second GNSS 
signal 
R R R   R  
EM Log   B     
Doppler Log   M     
Magnet 
Compass 
   B B   
Gyrocompass    M B   
THD     B   
ROT indicator     M   
Echo sounder       M 
IMU C C C C C   
e-Loran B     B  
R-mode B     B  
e-Pelorus C   C    
Radar(map-
matching) 
C       
TRN C       
R: Redundant B: Backup C: Contingency M: Main sensor 
  
Robust PNT information as required within e-Navigation 
needs three complementary components of GNSS [3]: (1) a 
core Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS); (2) 
augmentation of GNSS to ensure that GNSS system 
performance is fit for purpose, including DGNSS. (3) adequate 
backup in the event of GNSS system failure. Using the 
standard sensors it is difficult to handle GNSS outages, and 
hence the following techniques can be considered: 
A. Carriage of an additional GNSS device 
Once the major GNSS device (antenna or receiver) is out 
of use, the second GNSS device can fully take the function of 
the major GNSS device. Using multiple GNSS antennas could 
enable attitude determination. However, the redundant GNSS 
device is also affected by the errors related to the radio signal. 
In this sense, the significance of a redundant GNSS device is 
reflected during the internal failure of the major GNSS device. 
  
B. Use of two ore more frequency receiver for future GNSS  
GNSS satellites are equipped with more than one signal. 
Civilian code data will also be encoded into the carrier signal 
besides L1 signal at future GNSS satellites. The additional 
civilian code data will offer the same functionalities like the 
SPS service and therefore can backup the L1 code data. Due to 
different carrier signals, the other carrier signals might not 
suffer from the same interference, jamming or spoofing as L1 
signal. Also, the channel failure (loss of lock or cycle-slips, 
etc.) for L1 signal might not occur simultaneously on the other 
frequencies. When both signals are available the usage of the 
combination of two frequencies can additionally eliminate the 
ionospheric error. Nevertheless, errors due to space 
atmosphere and signal propagation will influence all the 
carrier signals of a satellite. Hardware failure of receiver or 
antenna might also challenge the reception of all carrier 
signals.  
C. Multiple GNSS systems  
Two or more full-operational GNSS could serve as 
redundancy for each other, as they realize same functions in 
maritime navigation as specified in [27]. Once one GNSS 
system is shut down or temporarily out of service, its function 
can be replaced by another full-operational GNSS system. 
However, GLONASS and GALILEO are not yet fully 
operational. Future GNSS receivers and corresponding 
antennas allow the reception and processing of multiple GNSS 
signals, however, a hardware failure can cause the loss of all 
GNSS signals.   
D. Terrestrial navigation system  
Such systems like e-Loran or R-mode facilitate the 
functions for positioning and e-Loran system can also be used 
for time determination, so that these systems could serve as 
backup for GNSS.  
1) e-Loran 
e-Loran, the modernized version of Loran-C, is a long-
range radio navigation system, operating at an assigned 
frequency of 100 kHz. A position is determined by measuring 
the time of arrival of signals from at least 3 stations in view 
[28]. The accuracy of e-Loran is specified in [3] as 8-20m 
where differential e-Loran corrections are provided and smaller 
than 100 m elsewhere. Compared to GNSS, e-Loran signals are 
transmitted at lower frequency with higher power and hence it 
is not easy to be jammed especially not by the same jammers 
used for GNSS. It relies on the radio signal propagated over 
ground and hence does not suffer from the same errors in the 
propagation path from sky like GNSS. Currently there exists a 
pre-operational e-Loran network in the UK and Ireland. 
Whereas the United States have decided to switch off their 
Loran-C service, operational Loran-C services can be found in 
parts of Russia and Asia. So the future of e-Loran as a 
terrestrial backup for GNSS with a large coverage area is 
currently an open question. Also, the fulfillment of the future 
maritime requirements with respect to the accuracy is an issue. 
2) R-Mode 
 
In [3], the Ranging-mode (R-mode) is seen as a possible 
novel variant of positioning technique using terrestrial signals. 
The idea is to use existing communication channels and append 
their functionality by sending an additional timing signal. From 
the time difference between signal transmission and reception, 
the ship should be able to determine its position. The advantage 
of this idea would be, that at least partially existing 
infrastructure could be used. Currently this is still only an idea, 
where the proof of concept needs to be shown. 
E. e-Pelorus 
The positioning relies on the bearing angles obtained from 
optic sensor with respect to known terrestrial objects. More 
than two bearing angles allow the horizontal positioning. The 
use of such a technique needs the objects with known 
coordinates and simultaneous tracking of several objects. For 
this purpose, an ‘electronic pelorus’ is proposed [3]. The 
independence of radio signal makes it a contingency for GNSS 
positioning. However, such a technique is still in a design 
phase and its performance needs to be proved. 
F. Radar map-matching  
For this technique the Radar image, containing relevant 
signature (e.g. coastline), is compared to map stored in the 
database. By application of a map matching algorithm a 
determination of a position could be possible. Such a technique 
does not rely on the radio signal and hence can serve as 
contingency system for GNSS. However, this technique is 
relying on a surrounding area which leads to a unique radar 
signal and hence can only achieve a limited local coverage. 
G. Terrain Referenced Navigation (TRN) 
In combination with a precise electronic navigation chart 
and a speed sensor the determined depth from an echo sounder 
could also be used for positioning. The independence of radio 
signal makes it a contingency system for GNSS. However, it 
relies on precision of the chart and the topographic conditions 
of the sea bottom. 
 
H. Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) 
The development in the field of inertial sensors, with 
increasing quality of rather low cost sensors, makes inertial 
navigation attractive for future civil maritime applications.  
Introducing an IMU into the PNT unit offers at least the 
following advantages: (1) It neither receives nor emits 
detectable radiation and requires no external antenna, and 
hence it is immune to signal jamming and inherently stealthy. 
(2) IMU can bridge GNSS outage within certain duration. 
From this point of view, IMU is a short-term contingency for 
the navigation. (3) In case that GNSS signals suffer from large 
multipath error or low signal to noise ratio, IMU can still 
measure accurate short-term relative movement to improve the 
positioning accuracy. (4) IMU could offer the functions of the 
mandatory sensors like logs, gyrocompass, rate-of-turn 
indicator. (5) IMU can provide high output rate if GNSS 
receiver is working under low data rate. (6) IMU allows the 
integrity monitoring of on-board sensor for these outputs. (7) 
The price of IMU at industrial and tactical level is quickly 
falling down. The significant limitations of IMU in maritime 
navigation lie in the following aspects. (1) The position, 
velocity and attitude accuracy obtained from IMU will be 
degraded with time due to the sensor bias and numerical 
integrations, so that long-term stability is still an issue. (2) The 
continuous vibration of the ships challenges the initialization of 
the IMU.  
In an IMU, the biases of gyroscopes and accelerometers, as 
well as the drift due to the integration need to be identified by 
integrating IMU with other sensors. The integration of IMU 
and GNSS using Kalman filter is the most popular integration 
scheme. It is also the basis for expending the integration to 
other shipborne sensors. For maritime navigation, loosely-
coupled and tightly-coupled integration strategies can be 
applied [29]. An advantage comparison between both 
architectures is given in Table IV. 
TABLE IV. ADVANTAGES OF DIFFERENT INTEGRATION ARCHITECTURES  
Advantages of loosely-coupled 
integration 
Advantages of tightly-coupled 
integration 
(1) faster responds to the IMU errors 
[30] 
(2) easy implementation for 
switching positioning models (for 
example, switch from DGNSS to 
SPS and vice versa)  
(1) integrity monitoring for each 
GNSS measurement 
(2) working under less than 4 
satellites in view 
 
  
V. INTEGRITY FOR PNT UNIT   
For a PNT unit, integrity monitoring can be carried out in 
three sequential steps. The first step is individual sensor data 
test. The second step is the compatibility test of similar data 
from different sensors. The third step is the fault detection and 
identification in the integration algorithm. A general integrity 
monitoring approach is depicted in Figure I. The first step is 
already elaborated in the previous parts. The second and third 
steps will be briefly introduced in the following parts:  
A. Compatibility test of sensor data  
Once a specific output can be provided by more than one 
sensor, different sensor data can be compared to perform the 
compatibility test. A significant discrepancy between different 
sensors implies the failure of at least one of these sensors. The 
upper bound for deviation should be defined either a priori or 
in real-time according to the previous measurements. From 
Table III it can be seen that most outputs can be provided by 
more than one sensor, so that the compatibility test is possible. 
The compatibility test should be carried out before sending the 
sensor data to integration algorithm.  
 
Figure I. General integrity monitoring for PNT unit (an example for GNSS, IMU and Log) 
B. Fault detection for integrated navigation system 
The plausibility tests, validity tests and compatibility tests 
are suitable for detecting gross sensor failure but not sensitive 
for slight error, time-variant errors and drifts. The Kalman 
filter-based algorithm could offer high sensitivity of detecting 
these errors. Integrity monitoring based on Kalman filter can be 
categorized into the following approaches [31].  
1) Kalman filter estimates (bias check) 
In a Kalman filter, the sensor measurement biases can be 
estimated. If an estimated bias is significantly larger than the 
error level specified by the manufacturer, there is likely to be a 
failure in the sensor. 
2) Innovation-based approaches 
The innovations indicate the consistency of the actual 
measurements and the measurements predicated by state 
estimates. Innovation filtering may be used to detect large 
discrepancies immediately, whereas innovation sequence 
monitoring enables smaller discrepancies to be detected over 
time. 
3) Residual-based approaches 
The above-mentioned innovation filtering and sequence 
monitoring can also be expanded to residuals. Residuals have a 
smaller covariance than innovation, making them more 
sensitive for error detection [31]. The only shortcoming is that 
the processing of residuals is not an essential part of a Kalman 
filter routine and needs extra computing time.  
Another popular approach related to residuals is the DIA 
(Detection, Identification and Adaption) approach [32], which 
is based on the a posteriori variance factor for a least-squares 
adjustment.   
4) Parallel solution of multiple sub-filters 
Parallel-solutions integrity monitoring maintains a number 
of parallel navigation solutions or sub-filters, each excluding 
data from one sensor or radio navigation signal. Each 
additional navigation solution is compared with the main filter 
using a consistency test. A significant inconsistency indicates a 
fault in the sensor or signal omitted from main filter. The 
system output is then switched to the solution omitting the 
faulty sensor or signal. The main drawback lies in the increased 
computational burden and hence this technique is preferably 
used for failure identification rather than failure detection. 
VI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS  
This paper focuses on a maritime integrated PNT unit as a 
possible replacement of the current mandatory EPFS onboard a 
vessel. We interpret a PNT unit as a system function, which 
collects and integrates data from individual PNT sensors in 
order to provide PNT information with a specified accuracy 
and integrity. The PNT unit should be based on a modular 
concept, though it could contain different sensors for different 
vessel types as it is required by IMO. For vessels equipped 
with an INS, it can be seen as a part of the INS to deliver 
robust PNT information. It should internally identify and 
automatically switch to the sensors or sensor combinations 
delivering the best PNT solution. 
Focusing on integrity for PNT information we have 
analyzed the current state of the art sensors and related 
maritime standards. Here we found a need of defining accuracy 
and integrity requirements for all parameters (e.g. position, 
SOG, COG) deduced from user requirements according to the 
different operational areas and/or volume of traffic and level of 
risk.  
Subsequently we have discussed additional sensors 
providing redundancy, backup or contingency functionality to 
the primary GNSS sensor. In this discussion one should not 
only consider terrestrial radio navigation systems but also the 
possible future usage of a second GNSS frequency and a 
second GNSS system. The development in the field of inertial 
sensors, with increasing quality of rather low cost sensors, 
makes inertial navigation attractive for future civil maritime 
applications. From our prospective inertial navigation could not 
only provide contingency functionality but could be a key 
enabler for an efficient integrity monitoring. 
As starting point towards a concept for the integrated PNT 
unit we have analyzed most relevant integrity monitoring 
approaches.  
Finally one has to state, that this paper can only be seen as a 
first step in the development of an integrated maritime PNT 
unit which can be one component in order to provide the 
mariners in the future with more reliable PNT information.  
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